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Notice by Citizen Plaintiffs in Environmental Litigation
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 1 introduced a "farreaching innovation"2 to environmental legislation. 3 Section 304(a)
of the Amendments authorizes any person to sue in federal district
court for an order that a polluter comply with standards promulgated under the Act or that the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) perform a nondiscretionary duty imposed
by the Act. 4 Prior to the 1970 Amendments, citizens could participate in enforcing environmental laws only by attending public hearings.5 Environmental groups praised the citizen suit provi1. Pub. L. No, 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, as amended by Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. II 1978)). For a
brief summary of the major provisions of the 1970 Amendments, see THE CONSERVATION
FOUNDATION, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO CLEAN AIR 4, 16-19 (1972).
2. See Ayres & Miller, Citizen Suits llnder the Clean Air Act, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC. NEWSLETTER, Winter 1971, at 2.
3. Major air pollution regulation began with the Air Pollution Control Act, ch. 360, Pub.
L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. II 1978)).
Congress revised its treatment of the air pollution problem in several subsequent enactments,
the most comprehensive of which include: Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392
(1963); Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (current version of both at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7615 (Supp. II 1978)); Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84
Stat. 1676 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. II 1978)); Clean Air Amendments
of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. II 1978)).
For a thorough history of air pollution legislation, see U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, LEGAL COMPILATION: AIR (1973) [hereinafter cited as LEGAL COMPILATION).
4. Section 304(a) of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 12(a)(304),
84 Stat. 1706, as amended by Safe Drinking Water Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-190,
§ 14(a)(77), 91 Stat. 1404, and Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95,
§ 303(a), 91 Stat. 771, is codified as 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (Supp. II 1978):
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any person may commence a civil
action on his own behalf(!) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other governmental
instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an emission standard or limitation
under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or State with respect to
such a standard or limitation,
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to
perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator, or
(3) against any person who proposes to construct or constructs any new or modified
major emitting facility without a permit required under part C of subchapter I of this
chapter (relating to significant deterioration of air quality) or part D of subchapter I of
this chapter (relating to nonattainment) or who is alleged to be in violation of any condition of such permit.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy or the
citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an emission standard or limitation, or such an order,
or to order the Administrator to perform such act or duty, as the case may be.
5. See Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, §§ 103(e), 108 (c,f), 81 Stat. 487, 492-96
(current version at 42 u.s.c. §§ 7403(e), 7410 (Supp. II 1978)); THE CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, supra note I, at 15.
Inadequate citizen participation was a major problem that the 1970 Amendments sought to
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sion, 6 and Congress soon copied it in other environmental legislation, including the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 7
Congress imposed some restrictions on citizen suits in the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1970 and in subsequent legislation. Section
304(b) states that a citizen suit against a polluter may not be commenced8 until sixty days after the plaintiff notifies the defendant and
the EPA of the violation. Similarly, the statute says that a citizen
cannot commence an action against the EPA Administrator until
sixty days after he notifies the Administrator of the action. 9 Plaincure through § 304. Public participation in enforcement is particularly important in the environmental area, where traditionally Congress has left responsibility for balancing the competing public interests (health, environment, economy, and energy) to restrained administrative
agencies. "To balance these issues properly, the public interest must have competent representation." NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT 1978/79, at 16.
6. See, e.g., Ayres & Miller, supra note 2 (National Resources Defense Council).
The effectiveness of citizen suits is not disputed. One commentator believed that citizen
suits "can be an effective tool for a better environment and enlarge the arsenal of the environmental lawyer which has become diminished through the limitations placed on the class ac•
tion." Steinberg, Is the Citizen Suit a Substitute far the Class Action in Environmental
Litigation? An Examination ofthe Clean Air Act of 1970 Citizen Suit Provision, 12 SAN Drnoo
L. REV. 107, 119 (1975). But others are not so optimistic:
[T]he citizen suit provisions have thus far proved relatively unsuccessful in stimulating
private enforcement actions. National environmental groups with experienced legal staffs
generally eschew suits against individual sources, preferring to devote their scarce litiga•
tion resources to federal policies of nationwide application. Local environmental groups
that would have an incentive to bring enforcement actions against individual sources
often lack the organization, seed money, and legal know-how to maintain citizen suits.
R. STEWART & J, KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 547 (2d ed. 1978),
7. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 2(505), 33 U.S.C. § 1365
(1976) [FWPCAJ. Other citizen suit provisions include: Toxic Substances Control Act, § 20,
15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1976) [TSCA]; Endangered Species Act of 1973, § l l(g), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)
(1976) [ESAJ; Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, § 105(g), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1415(g) (1976) [MPRSA]; Noise Control Act of 1972, § 12, 43 U.S.C. § 4911 (1976) [NCA],
Because subsequent citizen suit provisions were patterned after section 304 and were intended to serve the same purpose, see, e.g., S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 79, reprinted
in (1972) U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 3668, 3745, a court interpreting the citizen suit provision of one act will look to interpretation of the citizen suit provision in other acts. See, e.g. ,
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 699-702 (D.C. Cir. 1975). For
this reason, this Note will occasionally turn to court decisions relating to citizen suit provisions
in other statutes in order to interpret properly section 304 of the Clean Air Act. Similarly, this
Note's conclusions will apply to citizen suit provisions in other statutes.
8. The Senate Report accompanying the bill indicates that "commenced," as used in section 304(b), was equated with the filing of a complaint: "[T]he Committee has added a requirement that prior to filing a petition with the court, a citizen . . . would first have to serve
notice of intent to file such action. . . ." S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1970).
9. Section 304(b) ofThe Clean Air Amendments of 1970 is currently codified as 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(b) (Supp. II 1978):
No action may be commenced(!) under subsection (a)(l) of this subsection(A) prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice of the violation (i) to the
Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged
violator of the standard, limitation, or order
(2) under subsection (a)(2) of this section prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given
notice of such action to the Administrator • . . •
Excluded from the 60-day notice requirement are suits for violations of the Act's hazardous
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tiffs frequently fail to comply with the notice requirement, which
suggests that it may not be as "benign as it would first appear." 10
Although some courts dismiss suits if citizens have not strictly complied with the notice requirement, others circumvent the requirement by permitting suits despite defective notice or by authorizing
private suits under jurisdictional statutes other than the specific citizen suit provisions. 11 The inconsistent application of the notice requirement creates uncertainty for all parties involved in
environmental litigation.
This Note evaluates judicial handling of citizen suits tainted by
defective notice. After reviewing the legislative history of the citizen
suit provisions, the Note presents an array of judicial responses to
defective notice and classifies decisions by their stringency in applying the notice provision. In the final section, the Note argues that
Congress's purpose in requiring notice should determine the limits of
judicial tolerance of defective notice. It concludes that courts should
dismiss citizen suits unless actual notice of intent to sue, whether or
not in the form specified by EPA regulations, was given sixty days
before the filing of the complaint.

J.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NOTICE IN CITIZEN SUITS

Before 1970, the government alone could bring suits to enjoin
violations of federal air quality standards. 12 Frustrated by ineffective or insufficient enforcement of emission standards under the
Clean Air Act, 13 the Senate added citizen enforcement provisions to
amendments that had passed the House of Representatives. 14 The
pollutant section. The Act also prohibits a citizen suit if the EPA or State is already "diligently
prosecuting" a civil action to require compliance. See note 39 i'!fra.
10. Ayres & Miller, supra note 2, at xxix.
11. See text at notes 49-74 infra.
12. City of Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 332 F. Supp. 285,291 (N.D. Ill. 1971), qjfd.,
467 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1972).
The 1955 Air Pollution Control Act, ch. 360, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322, relied solely
on state and local government enforcement. Bolbach, The Courts and the Clean Air Act, ENVIR. REP. (BNA), Monograph No. 19, at 2 (July 12, 1974). The Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L.
No. 88-206, § 5, 77 Stat. 396 (current verison at 42 U.S.C. § 7415 (Supp. II 1978)), established a
conference procedure, and "authorized the first federal efforts in enforcement . . . of air pollution problems . . . [providing] that legal action could be taken [by the government] if the
conference procedure did not result in abatement of a pollution problem." Bolbach, supra, at
2. Under the 1963 Act, only one case proceeded to litigation, United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 287 F. Supp. 624 (D. ~d. 1968), qjfd., 423 F.2d 469 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
904 (1970). No cases were brought under the Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81
Stat. 485 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7615 (Supp. II 1978)), prior to the passage of
the 1970 legislation. See 116 CONG. REC. 32,914 (1970) (from first annual report of the Council on Environmental Quality, introduced by Senator Boggs).
13. See note 5 supra.
14. "The Senate struck out all of the House bill after the enacting clause and inserted a
substitute amendment." CoNF. REP. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970), reprinted in
(1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5374, 5374.
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citizen suit provision was originally proposed by Senator Edmund
Muskie and considered by the Senate Subcommittee on Air and
Water Pollution. By the time the House bill reached the Senate, the
Senate Committee on Public Works had already reported out a bill,
S. 4358, containing the citizen suit provision. 15
In hearings on the citizen suit provision, the Subcommittee on
Air and Water Pollution heard testimony supporting the citizen suit
provision from public officials 16 and attorneys in private and public
interest practice.17 Supporters argued that citizen suits would enhance federal agency enforcement of the Clean Air Act by forcing
the EPA Administrator to perform his duties. 18 They also emphasized the importance of providing a federal forum for citizen suits to
15. Each house of Congress entertained several bills to amend the Air Quality Act of 1967.
The Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works
considered bills S. 3229, S. 3466, and S. 3546. See Air Pollution -1970: Hearings on S. 3229,
S. 3466 & S. 3546 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on
Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. Senator Edmund Muskie had introduced S. 3546, which contained a citizen suit provision but no notice
requirement.
S. 3546, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(b), 116 CONG. REC. 5968-69 (1970) provided:
The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, regardless of the
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, of civil actions brought by one or
more persons on behalf of themselves or on behalf of any other persons similarly situated
within any air quality control region or portion thereof designated under section 107
against any person including a governmental instrumentality or agency, for declaratory
and equitable relief or any other appropriate order against any person, where there is an
alleged violation of any applicable a1r quality standards, plan for implementation or emission requirements established pursuant to this section. Nothing in this subsection shall
affect the rights of such persons as a class or as individuals under any other law to seek
enforcement of such standards.
This provision, together with a notice requirement, was added to S. 4358.
16. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 453 (statement of then Massachusetts Governor Francis Sargent): "I proposed a bill of rights which would give to the citizens of our
State the right to clean air . . . and the opportunity to take legal action if legal action is called
for. So I would support the concept."
Not all public officials supported the citizen suit provision. It was opposed by both the
Commerce Department and by a special assistant to the President. See How To Discourage
Suits by Concerned Citizens, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1970, § 4, at 6, col. 2.
17. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 622 (statement of James Moorman, Esq.):
I am very much in favor of this provision . . . .
... (I]t will materially speed up the process of restoring our nation's air quality ...•
The private attorneys general provision will bring the citizen into enforcement in a
dramatic and effective way. It will ensure, I believe, that many air pollution problems
that are being neglected will no longer be neglected. What is more, it will give the frustrated citizen who feels something must be done an opportunity to do something constructive.
18. At least one attorney believed not only that the agency alone would not enforce environmental standards, but that agency structure was such that it could not:
Experience has taught us that we cannot rely solely on government officials alone to get
the job done. The reasons for this are many. To list a few:
Administrators are given too many jobs for the amount of money appropriated. Enforcement is an unpleasant task and so it is often put at the bottom of the list.
Whenever the government acts, politics are involved. There is no way for administrators to escape politics. As a result, political considerations often slow enforcement. For
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avoid potential state bias against private enforcement. 19 Nevertheless, supporters voiced concern that citizen suits might disrupt the
enforcement activities of the administrative agency, thereby defeating or delaying a national air quality plan. 20
Industry representatives testified against the provision.21 They
feared that an unrestrained private cause of action would clutter the
federal courts with suits22 and frustrate cooperative e.fforts between
the EPA, the violator, and citizens.23 In response to the concerns of
example, a polluter may be an important employer that will use its political position to
prevent enforcement.
Sometimes administrative agencies become captured, at least in spirit, by those they
should regulate. The causes of this process are several and have often been remarked
upon.
Bureaucracies being what they are and always will be, they just will not hurry.
Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 622 (statement of James Moorman, Esq.).
19. I think the Federal courts are needed because the State judges in many States are
required to run in an election contest, with political considerations, even though not consciously, certain subconscious feelings, I think, would affect any judge, no matter how
honest he wants to be.
Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 823 (statement of Stanley Freiser, Esq.).
20. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 1184 (statement of Douglas M. Head,
Minnesota Attorney General):
The one danger . . . is the multiplicity of suits that would override compliance agreement[s] already entered into by the [Minnesota] Pollution Control Agency so that I believe that citizens should be very carefully correlated with the present enforcement
provision so that we do not unnecessarily duplicate the enforcement of the law and that
we do not unnecessarily clog up the course where we are in fact making very swift efforts
to enforce.
q. Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 817 (statement of Stanley Freiser, Esq.) (emphasizing
need for joint effort between citizens and government).
Part of the outcry against usurping the EPA's function sprang from the presumption that
the agency was better equipped to handle the complex questions that would arise. See 116
CONG. REC. 32,925 (1970) (remarks by Senator Hruska).
21. E.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 1108 (statement of Peter N. Gammelgard, senior vice president for public and environmental affairs, American Petroleum Institute):
We can see no special reason why actions involving alleged air pollution damage should
originate in federal courts, or why such actions should even be mentioned in this legislation. Paragraph (13) could well open the door to a rash of irresponsible nuisance actions
alleging damage where none can be substantiated.
See How To JJiscourage Suits by Concerned Citizens, supra note 16 (opposition by the National
Industrial Pollution Control Council).
22. See Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 1360 (statement of Southern California Edison
Co.):
We believe that enactment of this provision would result in a multiplicity of abatement
actions brought by private individuals, and harassment of defendants which would be
contrary to the public interest. The parties involved would incur enormous costs, as
would the public in connection with the administrative costs of the district courts involved. We do not think that the result would be a gain in effective enforcement of the air
pollution regulations, since adequate enforcement can be carried out by the regulatory
agencies involved, utilizing the remedies provided by existing Federal and State law.
23. See Senate Hearings, supra note 15, at 1570 (statement of David Swan, for the American Mining Congress):
[The citizen suit] introduces a concept of adversary relationship - between the public and
government or between the public and industry, or other institutions - which will inevitably create division when cooperation is essential; antagonism when understanding is
critical.
q. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
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both supporters and opponents,24 the subcommittee amended the citizen suit provision to require the plaintiff to give thirty days notice to
the EPA, its field representative, the violator, and the state air pollution control agency before filing a citizen suit. 25 The amended bill
and the thirty-day notice requirement were approved by the Senate
Committee on Public Works, and S. 4358 was forwarded to the
Senate floor. 26
The Senate debated the citizen suit provision at length. 27 Supporters argued that citizen suits would complement agency functions
by applying "important pressure." 28 They believed that the threat of
suit delivered by the required notice would trigger agency enforcement and encourage violators to comply with the Act. The thirtyday notice requirement would therefore ensure orderly citizen participation29 without overburdening the courts. 30 Proponents of citi(referring to "the obvious dangers that unlimited public actions might disrupt the implementa•
tion of the Act and overburden the courts").
24. An examination of the changes made by the Senate Committee suggests that it was
responding to the concerns expressed at the hearing. Compare note IS supra (original propo•
sal) with note 25 infra (statute proposed by the committee). The full committee also received
memoranda and position papers criticizing the provision. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra
note IS, at 1588 (position paper of Collier, Shannon, Rill & Edwards) (criticizing the thirty•
day notice period as insufficient time for the agency to act and avoid unnecessary suits, and
asserting that the provision ''would lead either to proliferation of citizens" suits or a larger
number of ill-considered protective suits by the agencies in the technologically complex air
pollution field"); Senate Hearings, supra note IS, at 1606 (position paper of Ford Motor Com•
pany) (citizen suit provision will create "a multitude of individual suits that clutter up the
courts, bedevil the Administrator and the regulated, and in general slow down the fight for
clean air'').
25. The provision proposed by the Committee read:
[T]he district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, regardless of the
amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce, or to require the enforcement of, [the provisions of this Act]. Civil actions for such enforcement, or to require
such enforcement, may be brought by one or more persons on their own behalf, (A)
against any person ... where there is alleged a violation by such person of any such
[provision], or (B) against the Secretary where there is alleged a failure of the Secretary to
exercise (i) his authority to enforce standards ... ; or (ii) any duty established by this Act.
(2) Nothing in this section shall affect the right of such persons as a class or as individuals under any other law to seek enforcement of such standards or any other relief.
(3) Prior to instituting any suit, under this subsection, such person or persons shall,
by certified or registered mail or personal service, notify (A) the Secretary, (B) an authorized representative of the Secretary, if any, in the field office responsible for the area in
which the alleged violation occurs, and (C) an authorized representative of the air pollution control agency of the State in which the alleged violation occurs, and (D) the person
or persons alleged to be in violation of such alleged violation. Such notice shall be in
accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary as to the content and specificity,
No such suit shall be filed unless such person or persons shall have afforded the Secretary,
his representative, or such agency, at least thirty days from the receipt of such notice to
institute enforcement proceedings . . . .
S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., § I l(b), 116 CONG. REC. 32,381 (1970).
26. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970).
27. See 116 CONG. REC. 33,102-05 (1970).
28. 116 CONG. REC. 32,903 (1970) (remarks of Senator Muskie).
29. The Senate committee report notes that thirty days would provide the agency time to
remedy the alleged violation. See S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1970).
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zen suits also argued that the potential increase in the caseload of the
federal courts should not be an overriding concern: "We must legislate to protect the public health, then strengthen our court system as
appears necessary."31
Senate opponents remained concerned about the potential increase in the workload of the federal courts. Shortly before the Senate debated the House amendments, Chief Justice Warren Burger
had publicly chastised Congress for overburdening the federal
courts. He asserted that "entirely new kinds of cases have been added because of new laws passed by Congress,"32 singled out a
number of antipollution proposals,33 and warned that "the Congress
. . . must examine carefully each demand they make on [the federal
court] system."34 Some Senators expressed concern that the subcommittee had not studied the potential judicial burden before including
the citizen suit provision in the bill.35
Opponents also objected to the burden citizen suits would impose
upon the EPA. They feared that if the agency could not handle a
problem within thirty days, it would have to devote time and resources to defending itself or testifying in suits against violators assets that could be more profitably employed in agency enforcement of the law. 36
30. [B]efore bringing suit, there is a requirement in this provision that the citizen bring
his intention to bring suit to the attention ofthe local enforcement agency, the thought being
that he might trigger administrative action to get the relief that he might otherwise seek in
the courts.
116 CONG. REc. 32,927 (1970) (remarks of Senator Muskie) (emphasis added).
31. Il6 CONG. REC. 33,103 (1970) (staff memorandum offered by Senator Muskie).
32. Excerptsfrom Burger's Talk, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1970, at 24, col. 4. These remarks
were made in Chief Justice Burger's first "state of the judiciary" address.
33. See Burger Warns New Issues May Overload U.S. Courts, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1970,
at I, col. 6:
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger said today that delays in Federal courts had become so
acute that the burden on the courts should be taken into consideration whenever reform
legislation was proposed.
. . . Mr. Burger took the unusual step of singling out potential areas of Federal legislation and warning against their enactment.
As an example, he noted that there had been a number of proposals for new Federal
legislation in the [field] of antipollution . . . .
34. Excerpts from Burger's Talk, supra note 32, col. 5.
35. [I]t is disturbing to me that this far-reaching provision was included in the bill without any testimony from the Judicial Conference, the Department of Justice, or the Office
of Budget and Management concerning the possible impact this might have on the Federal judiciary.
But to write such a provision into the bill now, without any idea of what it means especially in terms of our judicial system - seems very unfortunate.
116 CONG. REC. 33,102 (1970) (remarks of Senator Griffin).
36. 116, CONG. REC. 32,925 (1970) (remarks of Senator Hruska):
Notwithstanding the lack of capability to enforce this act, suit after suit after suit could be
brought. The functioning of the department could be interfered with, and its time and
resources frittered away by responding to these lawsuits. The limited resources we can
afford will be needed for the actual implementation of the act.
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Despite these objections, the Senate inserted S. 4358 in its entirety into the House bill and passed the bill as amended.37 The two
versions of the bill were then referred to a House-Senate conference
committee to resolve the inconsistencies.38 The conference committee lengthened the required notice to sixty days. 39 Although no written record explains this change, it seems likely that the Congressmen
on the committee were disturbed by the same concerns voiced by
Senate opponents of citizen suits. The House40 and the Senate41 approved the conference compromise with little comment, and President Nixon signed the Act into law on December 31, 1970.42
This brief legislative history indicates that Congress added the
notice requirement to section 304 of the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments as a compromise between the need for private enforcement
and a desire not to impose excessive burdens on the EPA or the federal courts.43 Senator Muskie observed that the bill that was ulti37. (1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 5356.
'
38. The bill passed by the House, H.R. 17255, contained
no citizen suit provision. The
conference committee incorporated into H.R. 17255 the provision contained in the Senate bill,
H.R. REP. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in (1970] U.S. CODE CONG, & Ao.
NEWS 5356, 5388.
39. Id. at 55, (1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 5388, The conference committee
inserted an additional provision to prevent unnecessary citizen suits. Section 304(b)(l)(B) provides that no action may be brought if the Administrator or state is already diligently prosecuting the violator in court.
Some commentators fear it takes far less than "diligent prosecution" to induce a court to
stay a citizen action:
[Section 304(b)(l)(B)] is meant to be a time-saver and duplication-avoider. It is open to
potential abuse because officialdom may attempt to foreclose a serious citizen suit by a
narrowly conceived compromise action. The requirement that the public't. ,nm'ated action
be prosecuted "diligently" ojfers scant protection in fact, although the possibility of an allegation of lack of diligence opens up interesting discovery and proof issues.
w. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW§ 1.13, at 79 (1977) (emphasis added),
Compare Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973) (court refused jurisdiction under the Clean Air Act where the EPA was holding legislative-type hearings), wlt/1
Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215 (3d Cir.) (civil penalty action before the Pennsylvania Hearing Board was not diligent prosecution because the Board did not have power to
enforce standards), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979), and Township of Long Beach v. City of
New York, 445 F. Supp. 1203 (D.N.J. 1978) (suit initiated by Administrator after citizen suit
filed is not diligent prosecution). A court may also avoid hearing a case where the agency is
taking some action by applying the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Although the court in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (FWPCA), took jurisdiction of the case, it reiterated a favorite maxim: "Sound discretion bids a court stay its hand . . . where it has reason to believe that furthi;r agency consideration may resolve the dispute and obviate the need for further judicial action." 510 F.2d at 703,
Thus, a court may defer to administrative action not truly comparable to "diligent prosecution."
40. See 116 CONG. REC. 42,519-24 (1970).
41. See id. at 42,381-95.
42. Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (current version at
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. II 1978)).
43. See 116 CONG. REC. 33,117 (1970) (remarks of Senator Cooper):
As originally proposed the [citizen suit] provision troubled me with respect to its impact
on administrative enforcement efforts and, of course, on the courts. During its consideration the committee made particular efforts to draft a provision that would not reduce the
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mately enacted retained the main thrust of his original citizen suit
proposal: it encouraged citizen suits and ensured more comprehensive enforcement.44 But the notice provision ensured that EPA enforcement would remain primary. The required notice was intended
to trigger agency enforcement,45 and to afford the EPA, state, and
violator sixty days to resolve the problem without being harassed by
a lawsuit.46 By guaranteeing time for cooperation and agency enforcement, notice also ensured that some citizen suits could be
avoided,47 thereby lessening the burden of citizen suits shouldered
by th_e courts.48 The notice requirement is therefore an integral part
of Congress's compromise between public and private enforcement
of the Clean Air Act.
II.

JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO DEFECTIVE NOTICE

The compromise that the notice requirement of the Clean Air
Act represents has met a mixed response in federal courts. Courts
have held varying degrees of compliance with the notice requirement
sufficient to allow citizen suits to proceed. Some courts take notice
as a jurisdicti_onal prerequisite and dismiss cases for lack of subject
matter jurisdi~tion if plaintiffs have not strictly complied with the
notice requirement. Others permit plaintiffs to commence suits
before the sixty-day period has passed if the notified party states that
effectiveness of administrative enforcement, and not cause abuse of the courts while at the
same time still preserving the right of citizens to such enforcement of the act.
44. Mr. EAGLETON. Would the Senator from Maine agree with me that this bill is
intended to afford to the citizens of the United States very broad opportunities to participate in the effort to prevent and abate air pollution? Are not the citizen suit provision and
the requirement for public hearings on State implementation plans likely to result in
higher quality and better air pollution control programs across the Nation than would
likely be the case if there were less opportunity for citizen participation?
Mr. MUSKIE. That was the thrust of the Senate bill in many respects, and although
we did modify the citizen suit provision I feel that thrust is retained. The Senate committee felt it would be impossible to do the total job of air pollution cleanup relying wholly
upon the Federal bureaucracy.
116 CONG. REC. 42,387 {1970).
45. [B]efore any citizen can bring an action, he is required to notify the enforcement
agency concerned of his intent to do so, and the specific, alleged violation which he has in
mind. In other words, the idea is to use citizens to trigger the enforcement mechanism. If
that enforcement mechanism does not respond, then the citizen has his right to go to
court. This is a inuch more limited application of the concept of citizen access to the
courts than anything that has been discussed by [the Senators bringing up consumer class
action bills].
,
116 CONG. REC. 33,103 (1970) (remarks of Senator Muskie).
46. See City of Highland Park v. Train, 374 F. Supp. 758, 767 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (the notice
period enables EPA to deploy employees from other cities in the investigation), ajfd, 519 F.2d
681, 690 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1976).
41. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 700 (D.C. Cir.
1975): "The notice requirement was intended to 'further encourage and provide for agency
enforcement' that might obviate the need to resort to the courts."
48. City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681,690 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
927 (1976).
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he will take no action to remedy the alleged violation. Some judges
are still more lenient: they assert that prior contacts between the parties, or even the complaint itself, can satisfy the purposes of the notice requirement. Finally, a few courts have reduced the notice
requirement to a dead letter by interpreting the "savings clause" of
the citizen suit provisions in such a way that plaintiffs can commence
citizen suits with no prior notice at all.
A number of courts strictly adhere to the language of the citizen
suit provisions of environmental legislation. Reasoning that Congress said what it meant and therefore that judges must carry out
what Congress said, these courts dismiss suits unless the defendant
was notified sixty days before the plaintiff filed the complaint.
Courts have employed this rationale to dismiss both suits brought
without any notice and suits filed less than sixty days after the defendant was notified. 49 No court, however, has dismissed a suit filed
after sixty days notice solely because the method or content of the
notice failed to comply with the EPA regulations that interpret the
statutory notice requirement. so
Massachusetts v. United States Veterans Administration 51 illustrates the strict compliance approach to defective notice. The Veterans Administration had allegedly violated the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act by failing to submit a sewer tie-in plan by the
49. Cases stating that to bring a citizen suit under section 304 the plaintiff must strictly
comply with the 60-day notice requirement include City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d
681, 690-91 (7th Cir. 1975) (no notice of suit alleging Administrator's failure to promulgate
regulations), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1976); Hiatt Grain & Feed, Inc. v. Bergland, 446 F.
Supp. 457, 501 (D. Kan. 1978) (dictum) (plaintiff tried to assert a CAA claim in a post-trial
amendment), qffd. on other grounds, 602 F.2d 929 (10th Cir. 1979); Philadelphia Council of
Neighborhood Organizations v. Coleman, 437 F. Supp. 1341, 1370 n.l 10 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (dictum) (suit allowed with jurisdiction based on transportation statutes), qffd. without opinion, 578
F.2d 1375 (3d Cir. 1978); West Penn Power Co. v. Train, 378 F. Supp. 941 (W.D. Pa. 1974)
(plaintiff sought to enjoin the EPA from issuing a notice that plaintiff had violated the CAA),
qffd. on other grounds, 522 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 947 (1976); Pinkney
v. Ohio EPA, 375 F. Supp. 305, 308 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (no notice prior to suit to enjoin shop•
ping center construction). Cases stating the same about section 505 of the FWPCA include
Massachusetts v. United States Veterans Administration, 541 F.2d 119, 121-22 (1st Cir. 1976)
(plaintiffs gave notice but prematurely filed the suit to enforce FWPCA permit requirements);
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (dictum);
Conservation Socy. v. Secretary ofTransp., 508 F.2d 927, 938-39 (2d Cir. 1974) (dictum) (no
notice given, jurisdiction actually based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ), vacated and remanded, 423 U.S.
809 (1975); Concerned Citizens v. Costle, 468 F. Supp. 21, 26 (E.D. Pa. 1978), qffd. on other
grounds, 592 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979); Loveladies Property Owners Assn., Inc. v. Raab, 430 F.
Supp. 276, 280-81 (D.N.J. 1975), qffd. without opinion, 541 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 906 (1977); Ventnor City v. Fri, 6 ENVIR. REP. CAs. (BNA) 2104 (D.N.J. 1974).
50. Dictum in one case, however, suggests that dismissal would be appropriate: "The law
is clear: In order to bring an action based upon [the citizen suit provision] a party must first
give sixty days notice of such action, and that notice must be given in the manner prescribed
by the . . . regulation." Ventnor City v. Fri, 6 ENVIR. REP. CAs. (BNA) 2104, 2104 (D.N.J.
1974).
See text at notes 81-84 i,!fra, for an argument that courts should not require strict compliance with the regulations.
51. 541 F.2d 119 (1st Cir. 1976).
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deadline specified on its effluent discharge permit. A private citizen
filed suit under section 505 of the FWPCA only forty days after notifying the defendant of the violation. 52 The plaintiff argued that since
no amount of administrative action could cure the violation, there
was no need to wait sixty days. But the First Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that administrative attention could still expedite
matters, and that a citizen suit could do no more. 53 The court therefore held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.
Federal judges sometimes create an exception to the strict compliance approach if the plaintiff notified the defendant but sued less
than sixty days later after the defendant asserted he would take no
action. In Natural Resources .Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 54
plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Army and Navy from dumping polluted dredged spoil. A federal district court dismissed the suit because the plaintiffs had commenced suit only fifty days after
notifying the violator and the EPA. 55 In reversing the district court,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the defective notice
served the purposes of the FWPCA notice requirement:
In this case there is, furthermore, a strong additional argument for
finding jurisdiction under § 505(a), since the purpose of the 60-day
waiting period, which is to give the administrative agencies time to investigate and act on an alleged violation, has been served. The EPA
and other agencies were given notice by plaintiffs of the alleged violations and plaintiffs were informed before this suit was commenced that
no action would be taken. 56

Courts have also created exceptions to the strict compliance approach where a plaintiff gave notice less than sixty days before the
original complaint but more than sixty days before a supplemental
complaint, 57 and where plaintiff's complaint in a prior suit served as
notice for the suit plaintiff refiled sixty days later. 58
A Nevada district court has followed a still more tolerant approach to defective notice. In Kennecott Copper Corporation v.
Train, 59 the plaintiffs never formally notified the EPA of their intent
to sue, but they had been in contact with the EPA regarding the al52. Section 505 of the FWPCA was intended to mirror section 304 of the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 701
(D.C. Cir. 1975). See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1971), reprinted in (1972] U.S.
CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 3668, 3745; H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 133 (1972).
53. 541 F.2d at 121.
54. 524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975).
55. 389 F. Supp. 1263, 1271 (D. Conn. 1974).
56. 524 F.2d at 84 n.4.
57. Montgomery Environmental Coalition v. Fri, 366 F. Supp. 261 (D.D.C. 1973)
(FWCPA).
58. Metropolitan Washington Coalition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 511 F.2d
809 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
•
59. 424 F. Supp. 1217 (D. Nev. 1976), revd on other grounds, 572 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1978).
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leged violation for four and one half months prior to the suit. The
court found that the unofficial contact served "the purpose behind
the 60-day notice requirement . . . to make the Administrator aware
of an alleged failure to carry out a nondiscretionary duty on his part
so as to allow him to remedy the failure and thereby avoid unnecessary litigation."60 Similarly, where a defendant had maintained
throughout negotiations that it did not have to comply with a state's
implementation plan, a federal district court in Minnesota refused to
dismiss the suit because further delay would not promote the purposes of the notice requirement. 61 Courts therefore occasionally allow prior contact to substitute for formal notice if the contact serves
the same purposes as formal notice.
Some courts go so far as to allow the plaintiff's complaint itself
to satisfy the notice requirement. In Riverside v. Rucke!shaus, 62 the
plaintiffs sought to force the EPA Administrator to publish an implementation plan for California's South Coast Air Basin. Although
plaintiffs gave no notice before filing the complaint, the court found
constructive compliance in that sixty days had elapsed from filing
the complaint until completion of the hearing. The court reasoned
that "[d]uring that sixty-day period the Administrator had all the
beneficial effect of the sixty-day notice provision, so the purposes of
the provision were fu1filled." 63 Since the United States as a defendant has sixty days to answer a complaint under rule 12(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this approach would virtually
erase the separate notice requirement from the citizen suit provision.
At least one court has specifically rejected the notion that the
complaint that commences a citizen suit can itself satisfy the notice
60. 424 F. Supp. at 1225-26.
61. Minnesota v. Callaway, 401 F. Supp. 524, 528 n.4 (D. Minn. 1975) (FWPCA), revd. on
other grounds sub nom. Minnesota v. Hoffman, 543 F.2d 1198 (8th Cir. 1976), appeal dismissed
sub nom. Minnesota v. Alexander, 430 U.S. 977 (1977).
Other extenuating circumstances have prompted courts to permit a citizen suit without
proper notice. In Save Our Sound Fisheries Assn. v. Callaway, 429 F. Supp. 1136 (D.R.I.
1977) (FWPCA and MPRSA), the EPA gave defendants a dredge dumping permit without
giving the required prior public notice and public hearing. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the
dumping but did not give the 60-day notice because relief would then be too late. The court
allowed the suit reasoning that if the EPA had given the required notice before issuing the
permit, plaintiff would have had time to give the 60-day notice.
In Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976), plaintiff first alleged a violation
of the Endangered Species Act by amending the complaint 10 days before the trial. Because of
the case's "unique evidentiary situation," the court reset the trial for a date more than 60 days
after the amendment. The court reasoned that since there were only five experts on the particular endangered species, the Indiana bat, more time would produce no additional evidence.
But the court warned, ''we would not be cited as authority for future disregard of the notice
requirement." 534 F.2d at 1303.
62. 4 ENVIR. REP. CAS. (BNA) 1728 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
63. 4 ENVIR. REP. CAS. (BNA) at 1731. The court also noted that during that sixty-day
period, the Administrator announced that he would not publish the plan for almost five
months. 4 ENVIR. REP. CAS. (BNA) at 1731.
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requirement. In City of Highland Park v. Train, 64 the plaintiffs
brought a citizen suit under the Clean Air Act charging that the EPA
Administrator had not promulgated certain air quality regulations
for Illinois. 65 They sought to enjoin the construction of a shopping
center and the widening of an access road until these projects had
been reviewed under the new regulations. Although they did not
notify the EPA before commencing the suit, the plaintiffs argued
that, since the government had sixty days to respond to the complaint, 66 the purpose of the notice requirement was satisfied. In rejecting that argument, the court noted that Congress was
undoubtedly aware of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when it
drafted the notice requirement. 67 It concluded that the sixty days
were meant to come before the plaintiff filed his complaint. 68
Finally, some courts avoid the notice requirement entirely
through an ingenious interpretation of the "savings clause." To insure that the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act would be
construed solely to create additional anti-pollution causes of action,
Congress added section 304(e) to the Act. 69 This savings clause
states that nothing in section 304 restricts any rights a person may
have "under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any
emission standard or to seek any other relief." 70 Relying on this language, the District of Columbia Circuit and some other courts have
allowed citizen suits on jurisdictional grounds other than section 304
- most commonly federal question or mandamus jurisdiction.71
They then conclude that since the notice requirement attaches to citizen suits only if jurisdiction is based on section 304, the plaintiff
64. 519 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1976).
65. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 called on the states to adopt plans to reduce
air pollution to the levels determined by the EPA Administrator. If the Administrator disapproves of any part of a state plan, he must promulgate his own regulations in place of that part
of the plan. 519 F.2d at 684-85. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253, 254 (D.D.C.),
qffd. per curiam, 4 ENVIR. REP. CAS. (BNA) 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), qffd. by an equally divided
Court sub nom Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973), held that the Administrator must
further ensure that state plans do not allow "significant deterioration" of air quality in areas
where the quality already exceeds the national standards. The plaintiffs in City of Highland
Park alleged that the Administrator had failed to promulgate "significant deterioration regulations" for four pollutants. 519 F.2d at 687-90.
66. See FED. R. C1v. P. 12(a).
67. 519 F.2d at 691.
68. 519 F.2d at 691.
69. See text accompanying notes 98-112 iefra for a discussion of how to interpret the savings clause.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (Supp. II 1978).
71. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) (federal question jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976)
(mandamus jurisdiction).
Courts have also based jurisdiction on the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701706 (1976). E.g., Montana Power Co. v. EPA, 429 F. Supp. 683 (D. Mont. 1977), revd. 011 other
grounds, 608 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1979). However, in Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977),
the Supreme Court held that the APA is not an independent basis of jurisdiction.
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need not notify the violator or the agency before filing suit. 72 Other
courts, most notably the Seventh Circuit,73 conclude that section 304
was intended to be the exclusive source of jurisdiction for citizen
suits. 74
This bewildering array of judicial responses to defective notice
confuses courts, citizen plaintiffs, EPA employees, and violators
alike. At one extreme, courts may require strict compliance and dismiss a suit; at the other, they may virtually ignore the notice provisions by allowing a complaint to serve as notice or by a broad
interpretation of the savings clause. Between the extremes lie numerous rules and exceptions, each a product of the conflicting sympathies generated when citizens working for a good cause blunder by
violating express congressional rules. In choosing among these positions we should refer to the congressional purpose behind the notice
requirement and citizen suits.
III.

A RESOLUTION: ACTUAL NOTICE

The task of drawing a line beyond which defective notice will not
be tolerated becomes fairly simple if one heeds clear congressional
intent. The language of the notice provision is not ambiguous, and
the legislative history merely underlines the purpose that is clear on
the provision's face. Both language and legislative history indicate
that courts should draw the line at actual sixty-day notice. 75
72. Citizens Assn. v. Washington, 535 F.2d 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (dictum); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975); Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 5 IO F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Township of Long Beach v. City
of New York, 445 F. Supp. 1203 (D.N.J. 1978); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train, 424 F. Supp.
1217 (D. Nev. 1976), revd. on other grounds, 512 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1978); Libby Rod & Gun
Club v. Poteat, 457 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Mont. 1978) (ESA), mod(jied on other grounds, 594 F.2d
742 (9th Cir. 1979); Save Our Sound Fisheries Assn. v. Callaway, 429 F. Supp. 1136 (D.R.I.
1977) (FWPCA); Montana Power Co. v. EPA, 429 F. Supp. 683 (D. Mont. 1977), revd. on other
grounds, 608 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1979); Minnesota v. Callaway, 401 F. Supp. 524 (D. Minn.
1975) (FWPCA), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Minnesota v. Hoffman, 543 F.2d 1198 (8th
Cir. 1976), appeal dismissed sub nom. Minnesota v. Alexander, 430 U.S. 977 (1977). See W.
RODGERS, supra note 39, § 1.13, at 78.
73. City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927
(1976). See text at notes 102-103 infra.
74. City of Highland Park v. Train, 519 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927
(1976); Pinkney v. Ohio EPA, 375 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Riverside v. Ruckleshaus, 4
ENVIR. REP. CAS. (BNA) 1729 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (dictum). See Steinberg, supra note 6, at 126.
75. None of the possible reasons for failing to give 60-day notice seems to justify permitting suit without notice. The possible reasons include the citizen's inability to understand the
requirements, lack of foresight, and the need for a speedier remedy. While the citizens desiring the suit may be unable to understand the requirements, they generally would consult an
attorney who should be able to understand them. Inadequate foresight suggests bad lawyering, and does not indicate a problem with the statute. Lastly, if the notice triggers agency
action, the violation may be more quickly remedied than it would be through a court. The
most likely reason citizen suits are filed without notice is that the element of surprise prevents
the EPA from making an insufficient, half-hearted enforcement attempt in order to preclude a
citizen suit. See note 39 supra.
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The language of section 304 of the Clean Air Act Amendments
and subsequent citizen suit statutes quite clearly commands sixty
d;ays notice prior to the commencement of the suit. If courts acknowledge that they must embrace the plain meaning of a statute
that is clear on its face, 76 they will require sixty days notice because
anything less "constitutes, in effect, judicial amendment in abrogation of explicit, unconditional statutory language." 77 A recent federal district court order dismissing a citizen suit marks the limits of
judicial discretion: "this Court is not at liberty to ignore the requirements of federal statutes . . . 'technical' though they may appear to
be."78
The purpose of the citizen suit provisions - to supplement
agency action with limited private enforcement - is also promoted
by fairly strict application of the notice requirement. Congress intended "to facilitate the citizen's role in the enforcement of the
Act," 79 but with some restrictions "because of the obvious danger
that unlimited public actions might disrupt the implementation of
the Act and overburden the courts." 8 Citizen plaintiffs were required to give notice to trigger EPA enforcement through threat of a
lawsuit, to allow a certain and reasonable time for cooperation and
coordination among the plaintiff, EPA, and the violator, and to pro- .
mote judicial economy by resolving violations out of court whenever
possible. These purposes suggest four rules of thumb courts should
obey in applying the notice requirement.
First, courts should require that the parties specified in the statute
were actually notified. For notice to trigger remedial action, it must
be received by the people who can remedy the violation - the alleged violator and the government agencies with authority to enforce
the law. If those parties receive notice, failure of the notice to conform to EPA regulations should make little di.fference. Thus if a
plaintiff sends notice to the wrong agency or official, 81 or employs

°

16. See 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01 (4th ed. 1973).
77. City of Highland Park v. Train, 374 F. Supp. 758, 766 (N.D. Ill. 1974), a.ffd, 519 F.2d
681 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1976).
78. Loveladies Property Assn., Inc. v. Raab, 430 F. Supp. 276, 281 (D.N.J. 1975)
(FWPCA), a.ffd without opinion, 541 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 906 (1977).
79. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
80. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
81. Two recent cases held actual notice given sixty days in advance, but transgressing some
regulation, to be sufficient because it satisfied congressional intent in creating the notice requirement. In Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976), citizen plaintiffs
sought to enforce the clean air provisions of New York's Transportation Control Plan, naming
as defendants the state, city, and Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA). The plaintiffs had properly notified the named defendants before filing suit. Later, they discovered that
MTA's sister agency, Transit Authority (TA), was actually responsible for the alleged violations and they sought to amend their complaint to add TA as a defendant. The Second Circuit
reversed the district court and held that the TA had sufficient notice.:
(Notice had been sent to] officers of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority ("MTA''),
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registered rather than certified mail, 82 the suit should not be dismissed if the plaintiff can prove that all relevant information did in
fact reach the right parties. 83 Of course, full compliance with EPA
regulations should be conclusive evidence of sufficient notice. 84
Second, notice should evidence an intent to bring suit on the violation if it is not remedied. Although the citizen suit provisions expressly require notice of intent to sue only when the EPA
Administrator is the defendant, this type of notice helps to trigger
remedial action in disputes involving violators as well. While prior
contacts between the plaintiff and the violator may show that the
parties were aware of the alleged violation, it is the threat of suit that
often motivates violators to take action and thereby makes resort to
the courts unnecessary. 85 Congress recognized that notice of intent
to sue a violator would be more likely to spur agency action than
the TA's sister agency, including their joint chairman ...• Although the MTA and the
TA technically are separate corporate entities under state law, they have the same chief
executive, the same Board of Directors, issue a combined annual report, and, at the time
of this suit, were represented by the same General Counsel. [They] had actual notice of
the alleged violations and of the proposed suit . . ., although the notice was addressed to
both men in their capacities as MTA rather than TA officials.
535 F.2d at 174 (emphasis supplied). The court stated that a technical reading of the statute
contravened Congress's purpose of encouraging citizen participation. 535 F.2d at 175.
In California v. Department of Navy, 431 F. Supp. 1271 (N.D. Cal. 1977), the notice allegedly failed to meet the regulations in three ways: it was sent to the regional EPA office, not the
Washington, D.C. office; it was sent to the Navy's environmental protection officer rather than
its agent authorized to receive service; and it was not sufficiently detailed. Nonetheless, the
court held that the failure to observe the regulations "in absolute literal fashion" did not here
interfere with the legislative design. The notice was "actual and effective," perhaps "the most
effective . . . for Section 304(b) purposes." 431 F. Supp. at 1278.
82. The regulations require that notice to the EPA Administrator be sent by certified mail.
Notice relating to emission standards and limitations must be sent by certified mail to the EPA
Regional Administrator, to an authorized representative of the responsible State Agency with
a copy to the governor, and to the violator by certified mail or personal service. Notice is
deemed given on the postmark date. Notice must contain charges of specific violations or, in
the case of a suit against the Administrator, the alleged failure to act. See 40 C.F.R. § 54
(1979).
83. Congress did not intend the notice requirement to "frustrate citizen actions with procedural trickery." W. RODGERS, supra note 39, § 1.13, at 77 (1977). Rather, Congress desired
that the regulations "reflect simplicity, clarity, and standardized form . . . [and] not require
notice that places impossible or unnecessary burdens on citizens .•.." S. REP. No. 1196, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1970).
Bui see Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train, 424 F. Supp. 1217, 1225 (D. Nev. 1976), revd on
other grounds, 572 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1978).
84. The Senate bill, S. 4358, specified the form of notice. See note 25 supra. The final
version deleted these specifications, delegating to the Administrator power to promulgate regulations on the notice's form. The similarity between the regulations' requirements and those of
the deleted language of S. 4358 suggests that compliance with the regulations should constitute
sufficient notice.
85. Cf. J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 191 (1971) ("[T]here is a tendency to take
the institution of a lawsuit seriously, and for public officials the initiation and pursuit of such
litigation is often a signal to reconsider their positions or to adopt positions formerly
avoided."); note 30 supra (idea behind requirement was that notice of threat of suit would
trigger action).
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notice of the violation alone. 86 Courts should therefore encourage
plaintiffs both to identify the violation and to indicate intent to sue if
it is not remedied.
Third, courts should require at least sixty days between notification and commencement of the suit. When courts permit suits to
proceed on less than sixty days notice, they cut short the period Congress intended to afford agencies and violators for voluntarily correcting a violation. And by entertaining suits over matters that the
EPA and polluters might have been able to settle in a full sixty-day
periqd, these courts increase the burden on the courts. 87
Finally, courts should measure the length of notice backward
from the filing of the complaint in the citizen suit. 88 To promote
voluntary compliance and to restrict the federal courts' caseload, noti:fied parties should have sixty days to remedy the problem in addition to the period between the filing of a complaint and trial of the
suit. Courts should require sixty days notice before the commencement of the suit not only because the plain language of the statute
requires it, but also because the atmosphere before the complaint is
filed changes once the suit commences. After the complaint is filed,
the parties assume an adversary relationship that makes cooperation
less likely. 89 Mere adjustment of the trial date90 or filing of a supplemental91 or amended92 complaint to cure defective notice cannot restore a sixty-day nonadversarial period to the parties. And once a
trial date has been set, compromise becomes less likely since the
plaintiff need do nothing more to invoke the court system for full
relief. Courts should therefore dismiss suits if the plaintiff did not
notify the defend ant and the EPA sixty days before filing the original
complaint. After the dismissal, the plaintiff can give proper notice
and, if necessary, refile the suit in sixty days. 93
These four rules of thumb offer a principled limit to judicial tol86. See note 30 supra.
87. See text at notes 22-35 supra.
88. See note 8 supra.
89. q. note 23 supra (citizen suit creates adversary relationship when cooperation needed).
90. E.g., Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976) (ESA suit allowed).
9 l. E.g., Montgomery Environmental Coalition v. Fri. 366 F. Supp. 261 (D.D.C. 1973)
(FWPCA suit allowed).
92. E.g., Loveladies Property Owners Assn., Inc. v. Raab, 430 F. Supp. 276 (D.N.J. 1976)
(FWPCA suit not allowed), qffd without opinion, 541 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 432
U.S. 906 (1977).
93. See Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961) (expansive interpretation of matters
to be considered jurisdictional for purposes of declaring a dismissal without prejudice); Minnesota v. Callaway, 401 F. Supp. 524, 528 n.4 (D. Minn. 1975) (noting plaintiffs announced
intention to give notice and refile the suit if the complaint was dismissed), revd on other
grounds sub nom. Minnesota v. Hoffman, 543 F.2d 1198 (8th Cir. 1976), appeal dismissed sub
nom. Minnesota v. Alexander, 430 U.S. 977 (1977); Metropolitan Washington Coalition for
Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 373 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1974) (dismissed suit can be
brought again after proper notice); FED. R. C1v. P. 4l(b).
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erance of defective notice, a limit consistent with both the language
and purpose of the notice provisions. Nevertheless, two problems
remain to be addressed: the possible exception to the sixty-day requirement if a notified party claims he will take no action, and the
use of the savings clause to circumvent the notice requirement.
Violators and EPA employees occasionally respond to a citizen's
notice by stating they will do nothing to correct the alleged violation.94 Plaintiffs tend to file suits immediately after such a response,
and courts may be tempted to allow the suit even though the plaintiff
gave insufficient notice. 95 They may be tempted because the parties
are unlikely to resolve the matter outside court and hence litigation
will result sooner or later in any event. If the alleged violation involves ongoing discharge of pollutants into the air or water, courts
may believe that the sooner the suit is commenced the better. Nevertheless, three considerations favor requiring sixty-day notice even in
these extreme cases. First, if the violation involves a hazardous pollutant, the statute expressly waives the notice provisions. 96 Second, a
violator or agency may well change its mind and remedy the violation as the threat of suit becomes more imminent. Courts that permit a suit immediately after a negative response to notice overlook
this possibility. Finally, if a citizen plaintiff is damaged by a violator's refusal to correct an ongoing violation, he can usually sue under
other statutes or at common law because the savings clause preserves
these causes of action. 97 This exception to the sixty-day notice requirement therefore seems unwarranted.
The argument that courts should circumvent the notice requirement through a broad interpretation of the savings clause requires a
more lengthy refutation. This is because the two leading decisions
on the savings clause are terse, somewhat cryptic, and in direct conflict. The savings clause states that nothing in section 304 of the
Clean Air Act Amendments "restrict[s] any right which any person
. . . may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any emission standard or to seek any other relief." 98 The
Federal Water Pollution Control Act contains an identical proviso. 99
94. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 84 n.4 (2d Cir.
1975) (EPA informed plaintiff that no action would be taken regarding alleged FWPCA violation). q: Minnesota v. Callaway, 401 F. Supp. 524 (D. Minn. 1975) (state sought declaratory
judgment that FWPCA required federal government to comply with state pollution regulations), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Minnesota v. Hoffman, 543 F.2d 1198 (8th Cir. 1976),
appeal dismissed sub nom. Minnesota v. Alexander, 430 U.S. 977 (1977).
95. See, e.g., National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 84 n.4
(2d Cir. 1975).
96. See note 9 supra.
97. See text at note 98 infra.
98. 48 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (Supp. II 1978).
99. 33 U.S.C. § l365(e) (1976).
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In Natural Resources .Defense Counsel Inc. v. Train, 100 Judge
Leventhal of the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that the
savings clause manifests congressional intent not to "cut back on
federal court jurisdiction over actions that would have been maintainable even in the absence of [the] special authorization [of jurisdiction in the citizen suit provision]." 101 Applying this reading of the
savings clause, the court decided that a citizen suit could proceed
without prior notice because it could be brought under federal question jurisdiction. Several weeks later, the Seventh Circuit in City of
Highfand Park v. Train 102 declined to follow the D.C. Circuit:
"With deference, we believe that the saving provision, expressing the
general intention of Congress not to disturb any existing rights to
seek relief, does not have the affirmative effect of removing conditions which existing law imposes upon the exercise of those
rights." 103 Because the Seventh Circuit believed that jurisdiction
under section 304 is exclusive, it affirmed a district court's dismissal
of a citizen suit commenced without notice. Although Judge
Leventhal's opinion is persuasive, his result is disturbing: the notice
provisions that Congress so thoroughly debated are effectively read
out of the statutes. The Seventh Circuit was obviously troubled by
that result, but it failed to say at what point it disagreed with the
D.C. Circuit's reasoning. A careful reading of Judge Leventhal's
opinion reveals both the flaw in his reasoning and the correct interpretation of the savings clause.
Prior to enactment of section 304, the government alone could
enforce air pollution standards. 104 The first subsection of section 304
- subsection 304(a) - created both a new cause of action (citizen
suits to enforce the Act) and new jurisdiction (it enabled district
courts to hear citizen suits without regard to amount in controversy
or citizenship of the parties). Subsection 304(b) contains the notice
requirements. Judge Leventhal viewed these notice limitations as restricting the jurisdiction, but not the cause of action, created in section 304(a). 105 While this view is itself debatable, 106 it is the D.C.
100. 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
101. 510 F.2d at 702.
""
102. 519 F.2d 681 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1976).
103. 519 F.2d at 693. The "condition" about which the court spoke seemed to be the availability of an adequate remedy, which precluded mandamus. The court found section 304 adequate. The court stated, however, that it was not holding that if the statutory remedy was
inadequate in a particular case other remedies would be unavailable.
As to federal question jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit said only that "[t]he [D.C. Circuit]
opinion does not give any reasons for the court's apparent holding that jurisdiction was also
conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1331." 519 F.2d at 693.
104. See note 12 m_pra.
105. 510 F.2d at 701.
106. The first sentence of section 304(a), "[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b)," created a
new cause of action - citizens could now sue to enforce the Clean Air Act. The second
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Circuit's further interpretation of the savings clause that is most
troublesome. Judge Leventhal implies that the savings clause
preserves jurisdiction to hear section 304(a) causes of action that
would have existed but for the jurisdictional provisions and limitations of subsections 304(a) and (b). 107 In other words, if citizen
plaintiffs can assert federal question or diversity grounds for jurisdiction, they can assert a subsection 304(a) cause of action without complying with the notice requirement because (1) the notice
requirement restricts only subsection 304(a) jurisdiction, and (2) the
savings clause preserves other grounds for jurisdiction.
Judge Leventhal's result hinges upon what "rights" are saved by
the savings clause. The D.C. Circuit believes the clause saves the
right to bring an action for a Clean Air Act violation under another
jurisdictional statute, while the Seventh Circuit believes the clause
saves the right to seek relief based upon an independent cause of
action. 108 The legislative history of the savings clause does not
clearly support one view over the other. 109 But surely the latter view
sentence of 304(a) conferred on the federal courts jurisdiction for these suits, without regard to
amount in controversy or diversity. See note 4 supra. This configuration suggests that the
notice required by subsection (b) was a limitation on the cause efaction created by subsection
(a).
107. 510 F.2d at 701.
108. For example, a polluting industry may meet the Act's air quality standards, but nevertheless fail to meet a stricter state nuisance law. The savings clause ensures the preservation of
the state nuisance action. Similarly, if the parties to this nuisance action were diverse in citizenship and met the amount in controversy and standing requirements, a federal court would
have jurisdiction. These two suits use neither the jurisdictional nor substantive sections of the
statute, and the savings clause expresses Congress's intent that the citizen suits not preempt the
area.
Similarly, plaintiff may assert that the savings clause preserves a federal common-law nuisance action against a polluter. However, in Committee for Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train,
539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976) (en bane), the court rejected such a suggestion. Plaintiff was a
citizen group seeking to enjoin the discharge of sewage into a stream. The discharge did not
violate the FWPCA. The court concluded the federal interest was expressed in the FWPCA
and it would be anomalous to find a federal common law that required something different
than a federal statute directly on point.
The Senate report indicates that Congress may have been concerned about preserving actions for damages:
It should be noted, however, that the section would specifically preserve any rights or
remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages could be sRown, other remedies would
remain available. Compliance with standards under this Act would not be a defense to a
common law action for pollution damages.
S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1970). See Comment, The Aftermath efthe Clean Air
Amendments ef1970: The Federal Courts and Air Pollution, 14 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV.
724 (1973), for a suggestion that damages may be sought through an antitrust action.
109. Indeed, proponents of both views, without further explanation, quote the same portion of the Conference Report as support. Compare Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 701 n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (supporting nonexclusivity), with Pinkney v.
Ohio EPA, 375 F. Supp. 305, 308 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (supporting exclusivity) (both quoting
H.R. REP. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 55, reprinted in (1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao.
NEWS 5375, 5388: "Other rights to seek enforcement of standards under other provisions of
liW were not affected.").
The committees did not explain the minor changes made in section 304(e) from the original
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makes more sense if courts are to give meaning to all the provisions
of section 304. 110 The D.C. Circuit view renders the notice provision
meaningless because "suits for violation of the Act would regularly
be filed without prior notice." 111 The Seventh Circuit view gives
meaning to both the savings clause (it saves preexisting causes of
action) and the notice requirement (it restricts section 304 causes of
action). Under this better view, courts that allow citizen suits without notice by holding section 304 jurisdiction nonexclusive are allowing citizens to exercise a right which did not exist before section
304, and which therefore could not be "saved" by the savings
clause. 112 Courts should therefore avoid using the savings clause to
circumvent the notice requirement.
CONCLUSION

Courts should applaud rather than undermine rare congressional
e.fforts to minimize the burdens new legislation imposes on courts or
administrative agencies. Section 304(a) of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 and substantially identical provisions in other statutes
gave citizens a new right to enforce the federal environmental laws.
Recognizing the problems such a right would create if it were not
limited, Congress added a notice requirement to each citizen suit
provision. Courts that fail to dismiss suits where notice falls below
this Note's standard are ignoring Congress's compromise between
public and private enforcement of the environmental laws. Courts
proposals, quoted in notes 15 & 25 supra (saving rights under "any other law"), to the final
form, quoted in text at note 70 supra (saving rights under "any statute or common law").
I 10. "A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no
part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not
destroy another unless the provision is the result of obvious mistake or error." 2A C. SANDS,
supra note 76, at § 46.06.
Ill. Pinkney v. Ohio EPA,}75 F. Supp. 305,308 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
Even before the federal question jurisdictional statute was amended to remove the amountin-controversy requirement, see Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 1331), such suits could easily
satisfy the jurisdictional amount-in-controversy requirements. ''The Supreme Court has recently indicated that this jurisdictional amount [$10,000] may be assumed in cases such as this
[environmental issues]." Minnesota v. Callaway, 401 F. Supp. 524, 527 (D. Minn. 1975)
(FWPCA), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Minnesota v. Hoffman, 543 F.2d 1198 (8th Cir.
1976), appeal dismissed sub nom. Minnesota v. Alexander, 430 U.S. 977 (1977).
Standing problems are also minor. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973) ("an identifiable trifle [of effect] is
enough for standing") (quoting Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REV.
601,613 (1968)); W. RODGERS, supra note 39, § 1.6, at 23-30. "In the space ofa few years the
question of standing in environmental litigation has shifted from a significant doctrinal barrier
to a nettlesome technicality." W. RODGERS, supra note 39, § 1.6, at 23. Rodgers notes that
"the inquiry into standing seems destined to begin and end with the question of whether the
plaintiff truly cares." Id. at 29. Essentially, all that is necessary is an allegation of injury in
fact. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (19n).
112. See note 108 supra for a discussion of what causes of action Congress may have been
trying to preserve.
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should require all citizens to give notice of their intent to sue sixty
days before filing a complaint under the citizen suit provisions. The
notice of the impending suit may inspire the agency or the violator to
remedy the violation, and cooperative efforts to remedy the violation
without resort to the courts can occur during the sixty-day period
prior to the filing of the complaint. This standard insures that the
notice requirement will operate as Congress intended, for the only
suits that get into court will be those where judicial intervention is
necessary to enforce the law.

